Tagged: Emissions trading

Library acquisitions — January 2017

We are pleased to send you our list of selected new acquisitions from January 2017. You can send your requests to Web.Librarian@wto.org.

The list is also available on Library’s website: http://intranet/__resources/library/_en/new_for_you_new_books.html.

For continuous updates on the latest trade news, don’t forget to check out the “Latest in trade” RSS feed: http://intranet/en/resources/library/library.htm

Kind regards,

Your WTO Library Team

Through 2 March 2017, take advantage of trial access to explore Elgaronline Ebook Collections and the Elgar Encyclopedia of Environmental Law! Elgaronline provides access to the ebook versions of more than 3500 Elgar publications in the subject areas of law, economics, business, and social and political sciences. The Elgar Encyclopedia of Environmental Law is an online resource and twelve-volume collection on major themes relating to the environment, including water law, multilateral environmental treaties, and trade and environmental law.

For more information and to explore these resources during this limited trial period, visit Elgaronline here: https://www.elgaronline.com/. Select the “Browse” tab from the menu at the top of the page; then, under “Refine by access” in the menu on the left side of the page, select “All accessible content.” All materials accompanied by a green circle are available for consultation.

Elgar Encyclopedia of Environmental Law may be found directly here: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/nlm-book/9781786436986/9781786436986.xml

Covers Title, Authors/Editor details, WTO catalogue records email request links Previews
Os acordos da OMC : textos completes e sĂ­nteses / Gilberto D. F. AntĂłnio.

WTO catalogue : http://wto.aquabrowser.com/?itemid=|WTO-Marc|1926585

Request: web.librarian@wto.org

Preview unavailable
Climate finance : regulatory and funding strategies for climate change and global development / edited by Richard B. Stewart, Benedict Kingsbury, and Bryce Rudyk.

WTO catalogue : http://wto.aquabrowser.com/?itemid=|WTO-Marc|1926591

Request: web.librarian@wto.org

Preview: https://goo.gl/L6K7Vr

Crisis internacional : impactos y respuestas de política económica en el Perú / [edited by] Óscar Dancourt, Félix Jiménez.

WTO catalogue : http://wto.aquabrowser.com/?itemid=|WTO-Marc|1926614

Request: web.librarian@wto.org

Full text: https://goo.gl/4AoKCC

Defesa comercial no Brasil / Welber Barral, Gilvan Brogini.

WTO catalogue : http://wto.aquabrowser.com/?itemid=|WTO-Marc|1926575

Request: web.librarian@wto.org

Preview unavailable
EU anti-subsidy law and practice / Konstantinos Adamantopoulos, MarĂ­a J. Pereyra.

WTO catalogue : http://wto.aquabrowser.com/?itemid=|WTO-Marc|1926593

Request: web.librarian@wto.org

Preview: http://goo.gl/2WnlgM

Opciones de política económica en el Peru : 2011-2015 / [edited by] José Rodríguez y Mario D. Tello.

WTO catalogue : http://wto.aquabrowser.com/?itemid=|WTO-Marc|1926608

Request: web.librarian@wto.org

Full text: https://goo.gl/bLZ0yc

Perfiles comerciales 2016 / OrganizaciĂłn Mundial del Comercio.

WTO catalogue : http://wto.aquabrowser.com/?itemid=|WTO-Marc|1926639

Request: web.librarian@wto.org

Full text: https://goo.gl/PiHDz7

Profils commerciaux 2016 / Organisation mondiale du commerce.

WTO catalogue : http://wto.aquabrowser.com/?itemid=|WTO-Marc|1926637

Request: web.librarian@wto.org

Full text: https://goo.gl/24ChLz

Promoting dynamic and innovative growth in Asia : the cases of special economic zones and business hubs / edited by Hyung-Gon Jeong and Douglas Zhihua Zeng.

WTO catalogue : http://wto.aquabrowser.com/?itemid=|WTO-Marc|1926589

Request: web.librarian@wto.org

Preview: https://goo.gl/PLoiWt

Research handbook on emissions trading / edited by Stefan E. Weishaar.

WTO catalogue : http://wto.aquabrowser.com/?itemid=|WTO-Marc|1926323

Request: web.librarian@wto.org

Preview: https://goo.gl/nxjvMy

Teoría económica y desarrollo social : exclusión, desigualdad y democracia : homenaje a Adolfo Figueroa / [edited by] Félix Jiménez.

WTO catalogue : http://wto.aquabrowser.com/?itemid=|WTO-Marc|1926604

Request: web.librarian@wto.org

Full text: https://goo.gl/Y3g1lp

Trade discourse in Kenya : some topical issues / [edited by] Tabitha Kiriti-Ng’ang’a, Jasper A. Okelo.

WTO catalogue : http://wto.aquabrowser.com/?itemid=|WTO-Marc|1926598

Request: web.librarian@wto.org

Preview unavailable
Trade profiles 2016 / World Trade Organization.

WTO catalogue : http://wto.aquabrowser.com/?itemid=|WTO-Marc|1926531

Request: web.librarian@wto.org

Full text: https://goo.gl/VsOQPr



Climate game analyses for CO2 emission trading among various world organizations

This paper simulates the saving in terms of the total abatement cost of CO2 emission reductions for different trading games reflecting the potential cooperation among organizations including the European Union (EU), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries, the Union of South American Nations (USAN), and the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). A game approach is conducted to determine if the cooperation will come into existence among the organizations stated above. A similar idea is applied to the four largest emission countries, China, the United States, Russia, and India, as four individual players in the trading game.

Full-text available in .pdf

On the empirical content of carbon leakage criteria in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme

The EU Emissions Trading Scheme continues to exempt industries deemed at risk of carbon leakage from permit auctions. Carbon leakage risk is established based on the carbon intensity and trade exposure of each 4-digit industry.

Full-text available in .pdf

Endogenous market power in an emissions trading scheme with auctioning

This paper contributes to the literature on market power in emissions permits markets, modeling an emissions trading scheme in which polluters differ with respect to their marginal abatement costs at the business-as-usual emissions. The polluters play a two-stage static complete information game in which their market power arises endogenously from their characteristics. In the first stage all polluters bid in an auction for the distribution of the fixed supply of permits issued by the regulator, and in the second stage they trade these permits in a secondary market.

Full-text available in .pdf

International carbon emissions trading and strategic incentives to subsidize green energy / Thomas Eichner and RĂĽdiger Pethig

The article examines strategic incentives to subsidize green energy in a group of countries that operates an international carbon emissions trading scheme. Green subsidies of either sign on top of emissions cap regulation reduce the welfare of the group of countries, but this may not hold for individual countries. The cases of small and large countries turn out to exhibit significant differences. While small countries refrain from subsidizing green energy and thus implement the efficient allocation, large permit-importing countries may subsidize green energy in order to influence the permit price in their favor.

Full-text available in .pdf

Tradable permits vs ecological dumping when governments act non-cooperatively / Fabio Antoniou, Panos Hatzipanayotou and Phoebe Koundouri

In this paper we incorporate tradable permits in a model of strategic environmental policy as an alternative policy scheme. In particular, we develop an international oligopoly model, where governments issue non-cooperatively a number of permits and then allow their trading by their polluting firms. Permits trading is a dominant strategy and it ensures that welfare is strictly higher than in a situation where permits are non-tradable. When the permits market is efficient, exporting countries have an incentive to tighten regulation in order to enhance their firms’ competitiveness. Allowing for market power in the permits market, the incentive to relax regulation may re-appear, yet it is comparatively weaker relative to the case of non-tradable permits. The benefits of this policy scheme disappear if the governments along with emission permits adopt an emissions subsidy.

Full-text available in .pdf

Towards global carbon pricing : Direct and indirect linking of carbon markets / Rob Dellink, StĂ©phanie Jamet, Jean Chateau, Romain Duval

Emissions trading systems (ETS) can play a major role in a cost-effective climate policy framework. Both direct linking of ETSs and indirect linking through a common crediting mechanism can reduce costs of action.We use a global recursive-dynamic computable general equilibrium model to assess the effects of direct and indirect linking of ETS systems across world regions. Linking of domestic Annex I ETSs leads to moderate aggregate cost savings, as differences in domestic permit prices are limited. Countries benefit directly from linking by either buying permits and avoiding investing in highcost mitigation options, or by exploiting relatively cheap mitigation options and selling permits at a higher price. Although the economy of the main permit sellers, such as Russia, is negatively affected by the real exchange rate appreciation that is induced by the large export of permits, on balance they also still benefit from linking. The costsaving potential for developed countries of well-functioning crediting mechanisms appears to be very large. Even limited use of credits would nearly halve mitigation costs; cost savings would be largest for carbon-intensive economies. However, one open issue iswhether these gains can be fully reaped in reality, given that direct linking and the use of crediting mechanisms both raise complex system design and implementation issues. The analysis in this paper shows, however, that the potential gains to be reaped are so large, that substantial efforts in this domain are warranted.

Full-text available in .pdf